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A Bridge Too Far: Individualised Claims of Conscience 
 
Abstract 
This article will explore the role of conscience in cases which are not subject to a predictable, 
generalizable rule-based conscientious objection. These claims arise in cases where doctors, 
who might have previously provided the treatment at issue, determine that the specific facts 
of a case mean that they cannot morally provide treatment. In legal cases, the courts have 
tended to act as if these conscience refusals are part of the best interests analysis. They claim 
that the treatment, as requested, simply is not in the best interests of the patient. However, the 
courts have used this analysis even when it appears clear that the refusal of treatment is not in 
what the patient thinks is his or her best interests. Indeed, in recent cases such as Aintree v. 
James, the court has made it clear that determining what is in the best interests of patients 
usually relies more on the advice of healthcare professionals than it does the patient. It is not, 
then, about what patients think they need or want, but what doctors and other medical staff 
think they can morally provide under the circumstances. This article will explore how re-
conceptualizing these sorts of claims as ones about conscience provides a more stable footing 
for understanding the legal and ethical issues which are of importance to the courts and what 
this might mean for these sorts of decisions in the future.  
 
Keywords: Aintree v. James, best interests, conscience, doctors, medical ethics, medical 
treatment  
 
I. Introduction 
 
We expect doctors1 to act according to conscience.  Indeed, we not only expect it but mandate 
it through the use of professional codes of conduct,2, ethical statements,3 and international 
treaties.4  General discussions about conscience, though, tend to focus on rule-based 
expressions of conscience.  These are instances in which an individual doctor objects to an 
entire class of practices. For example, she might not wish to provide abortions and, therefore, 
expresses a conscientious objection to that practice.  Even claims of conscience which 
express a more limited objection, for example, if a doctor objects to the provision of abortion 
only in cases where the individual is seeking an abortion on the basis of sex, are often based 
upon some sort of generalizable rule.  As a consequence, there are a number of ways to 
address these kinds of concerns.  We may create a specific statutory grant of conscience, such 
as the one which exists in section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967.  Even if we do not create a 
specific statutory grant which allows someone to claim a conscientious objection, one may be 
created by procedures, administrative rules, or other processes.5  Moreover, parties within the 
process can engage in a period of negotiation in order to attempt to resolve disagreements.  If 
doctors have significant objections to particular practices, they may also leave a specialism 
(e.g., those opposed to abortion could decide to leave obstetrics and gynaecology 
specialisms) or even medical practice as a whole.  This is all possible because these sorts of 
conscientious objections are predictable prior to the event. 
 
                                                 
1
 Much of what I say here is also applicable to nurses or other healthcare professionals.  Due to space 
limitations, I focus specifically on the conscience claims of doctors. 
2
 General Medical Council (GMC), Good Medical Practice, http://www.gmc-
uk.org/guidance/good_medical_practice.asp (accessed 21 February 2015). There are important differences 
between personal ethical codes and professional ones, and my primary focus here is on a doctor’s individual 
conscience. 
3
 See, e.g. The Hippocratic Oath. 
4
 See, e.g. the Declaration of Helsinki. 
5
 Hospitals might, for example, allow doctors to opt out of providing particular treatments if other medical staff 
can provide the treatment instead. 
Other claims of conscience6 are not so predictable.  For example, doctors might object to 
particular instances which are not necessarily covered by (predictable) generalizable rules.  
These cases may involve practices which the doctor does not usually object to but does so in 
this instance on these facts.  This may well occur in end-of-life cases where doctors have 
provided a particular treatment, or set of treatments, and then decide that they have reached a 
‘bridge too far’, so that that treatment previously provided has now become objectionable. 
Since these claims involve individualised fact scenarios and practices which are often not 
objectionable in themselves, it may not be possible to predict when they will arise in advance.  
Consequently, our strategies for dealing with clashes between patient treatments and claims 
of conscience are less effective.  It is difficult to create a specific statutory grant about such 
practices if they are otherwise indistinguishable (on a general level) from other cases where 
claims of conscience would not attach. It may also not be possible for the parties to engage in 
negotiations beforehand since it might be difficult to specify what conditions will trigger the 
claims of conscience.  Instead, it is more likely that the claim will arise in situations which 
can only be described in vague language like ‘if it goes too far’ or ‘this far but no further’, but 
where neither side can predict what ‘this far’ is likely to mean. These type of cases are 
especially important in discussing conscience because of the link between the claim of 
conscience and proper medical treatment. Both the provision of treatment in these conditions 
as well as the withdrawal or withholding of treatment are likely to be considered proper 
medical treatment. The issue will then centre on what the doctor feels she can do in a moral 
sense within the bounds of what is proper in a clinical sense. 
 
                                                 
6
 Conscience-based claims are often referred to either as conscience-based exemptions or conscientious 
objections.  In order to differentiate between the types of conscience claims I am concerned with here from the 
generally discussed types, the individualised ones I am discussing will be referred to as claims of conscience 
with all others called conscientious objections. 
A recent example of the type of case I am envisaging is Aintree v. James.7  Here David 
James, having contracted an infection, had been in the hospital for several months.  While he 
was not ‘actively dying’, his condition was in decline.  In December 2012, he was declared to 
lack the capacity to make decisions for himself, and the doctors petitioned the court to be 
allowed to withhold treatment from him in certain situations.  In particular, they wished to 
withhold cardiopulmonary resuscitation, an ‘invasive support for circulatory problems’, and 
renal replacement therapy (RRT).8  The latter might be particularly relevant for the purposes 
of conscience because while not painful in itself, there can be pain with some of the 
associated procedures necessary for RRT, inserting a needle for example.9  More importantly, 
in order to ensure that the patient’s blood runs through the renal replacement machine, the 
patient must be given blood-thinning drugs.  One consequence of these drugs is that, because 
the blood in the patient is thinner, they are more likely to feel cold, often to such a degree that 
they shiver.10  The doctors were concerned as they thought it likely that David would require 
RRT all day every day.11  They believed that there was a good chance that he would be 
shiveringly cold for the entire time he was on the machine, possibly for the rest of his life.  
The doctors’ objection was not that the treatment would not work, but that to administer it 
was something they could not reasonably be asked to do to a patient.12  The doctors do not 
explicitly say that they have a problem of conscience, but this is a reasonable presumption 
from the language they use, and I discuss this further in Section III below. 
 
Notably, there was no evidence that the doctors objected to any of the proposed treatments as 
practices in and of themselves.  Indeed, they had administered some of them to David prior to 
                                                 
7
 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James, [2013] UKSC 67. 
8
 James (n 7) [8] per Lady Hale.  
9
 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] EWCA Civ 65, [24] per Ward LJ. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid.  
12
 Ibid [22], [24], [25] per Ward LJ.. 
the time period in question.  This, therefore, was different from a case where a doctor objects 
to the provision of RRT in all instances.  They instead argued that they could not provide 
these treatments in this particular case under these particular facts.  None of the treatments 
were morally objectionable in general, but they were here and, as a consequence, the doctors 
argued that they should not be forced to provide them. 
 
The case was not decided by any reference to conscience.  Neither party appears to have 
mentioned claims of conscience, nor did the judges rely on them in making their decisions.  
Instead, they relied on the standard ‘best interests’ analysis.13  Nevertheless I argue that doing 
so disguised rather than illuminated the important issues in the case.  The main issue to be 
decided was not the best interests of David James but the extent to which the doctors should 
have been required to provide treatment they objected to.  A more direct analysis of claims of 
conscience would have provided a more accurate resolution to the case at hand.  To do this, 
however, would require that courts have a better understanding of how to address claims of 
conscience like the one in James.  They do not currently have any effective method for doing 
so, and thus rely on distorted analysis under the best interests test.  My purpose here is to 
provide a means of analysis that courts could use in these types of case.  In order to do this, 
some preliminary work must be done on what we mean when we discuss conscience, before 
developing a conceptual model for exploring these kinds of conscience claims.  I will then 
return to a discussion of James in order to test the usefulness of this conceptual model.  
Finally, I will explore the model’s normative implications. 
 
II. Concept of conscience 
 
                                                 
13
 Ibid. [15], [45]; James (n 7) [35]-[45]. 
Before attempting to create a conceptual model of claims of conscience in medical treatment, 
we need an understanding what conscience is.  We often talk about doing something ‘in good 
conscience’,14 or we might refer to being able to do something with a ‘clear conscience’.15  
What do we normally mean when we talk about conscience in these sorts of ways?  
Conscience involves reasons which are both moral (at least partially) 16 as well as intentional. 
They must also be inward-facing. Conscience claims are about my moral choices and 
decisions, not what I necessarily think others are required to do.17  More specifically, 
conscience, in the way we generally use it, is a feeling, attitude, or belief, which is frequently 
but not necessarily based upon religion, about whether doing something is right or wrong.18  
Feelings, beliefs, or emotions can provide reasons for action,19 and conscience is no different 
in that regard.20  It provides an impetus for acting in a certain way, but that does not 
necessarily require any complex thought pattern or rationale.  Instead, we often use 
conscience as a ‘moral nose.’21    Because of conscience, we shy away from various actions 
or activities and are drawn towards others, but it may not be especially clear why this is the 
case. Conscience also does not have to be correct.22  Merely because one is acting from a 
clear conscience does not necessarily make it right.  It only means the individual in question 
                                                 
14
 JF Childress, ‘Conscience and Conscientious Actions in the Context of MCOs’ (1997) 7 Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics Journal 403, 403; FA Curlin, ‘Conscience and clinical practice: Medical ethics in the face of moral 
controversy’ (2008) 29 Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 129, 129. 
15
 C. Fitzgerald, ‘A Neglected Aspect of Conscience: Awareness of Implicit Attitudes’ (2014) 28 Bioethics 2, 
25. 
16
 EJ Sutton and REG Upshur, ‘Are there different spheres of conscience? (2010) 16 Journal of Evaluation in 
Clinical Practice 338, 339. 
17
 E Sepper, ‘Taking Conscience Seriously’ (2012) 98 Virginia Law Review 1501, 1526-1531.  
18
 Childress (n 14) 403; Sepper (n 17) 1527-1528.W. Kinghorn, ‘Conscience as Clinical Judgment: Medical 
Education and the Virtue of Prudence’ (2013) 3 American Medical Association Journal of Ethics 202. 
19
 Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: the Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2001). 
20
  Childress (n 14) 403-404.  Childress highlights, however, that it not just a belief but a consistency between 
our beliefs and our actions.  Also, FA Curlin, ‘Caution: Conscience is the Limb on Which Medical Ethics Sits’ 
(2007) 7 The American Journal of Bioethics 30, 31; Sutton and Upshur (n 16) 339.  
21
 J Glover, ‘On Moral Nose’ in John Coggon, Sarah Chan, Soren Holm, Thomasine, Kushner (eds), From 
Reason to Practice in Bioethics: An Anthology Dedicated to the Works of John Harris, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2015). 
22
 Curlin (n 14) 31; Sepper (n 17) 1530.  
believes it to be.  Moreover, one does not have to perform a morally beneficial action in order 
to be able to do so with a clear conscience.  Instead, we have a clear conscience when we 
have not done something morally wrong.  This may include actions which we think are 
morally neutral in addition to those we think are morally bad.      
 
Conscience, then, is the doing or failing to do something on the basis of our beliefs about the 
rightness or wrongness of the conduct in question.23  Notice, however, that conscience claims 
do not necessarily require that one act according to a moral rule.  A claim of conscience 
requires that the reason in question be a moral one, but it need not be a rule-based reason.  
One can have a moral qualm about performing a particular action in one case without it 
necessitating that the individual be able to articulate a rule as to why.  This may be because 
the claim is based upon a moral hunch, but it might also be because there are a number of 
ethical rules at play in a particular case.  It might, therefore, not be possible to articulate a 
single rule behind the claim of conscience.  Nor is it necessarily a claim which must be 
predictable, especially if we consider conscience in the context of a moral ‘nose’ or hunch.  
The beliefs, feelings, and emotions which create feelings of conscience may only arise when 
the issue becomes an impending one and not previously.  This again might be especially true 
when there are a number of ethical rules which combine in a particular instance to create the 
claim.  The set of circumstances might not be predictable or may only be predictable in very 
general terms. 
 
Defining conscience does not end the inquiry.  In fact, the use of conscience creates particular 
problems in moral decision-making that need to be addressed.  Conscience claims are 
frequently, if not always, controversial.  Not everyone will agree with what individuals 
                                                 
23
 Childress (n 14) 403; Fitzgerald (n 15). 
believe to be matters of conscience.  Indeed, one of the purposes of conscience is to provide a 
way in which individuals can act upon their moral beliefs or attitudes without having to agree 
to a consensus view as to what those moral beliefs and attitudes are. Furthermore, conscience 
is likely to affect others, particularly in a healthcare setting. It is important that claims of 
conscience are evaluated in terms of the impact upon others. A claim which provided an 
unacceptable adverse effect upon other individuals need not be allowed merely because it is 
one of conscience.   
 
For these reasons, we can question the benefits of privileging conscience at all.  There are 
some initial reasons why we might believe conscience deserves a special place.  First, 
conscience claims are usually based on strong feelings.  We rarely make a serious claim in a 
situation where we do not find it important, even if all we are doing is negating the strong 
feelings of someone else.  Invoking conscience, then, is at least partially a claim that the 
feelings involved are considerable ones.  This strength of feeling provides an initial reason to 
accept an individual’s claim of conscience, especially in cases which do not involve a direct 
harm to anyone else.  Requiring someone to do something they may not want in a case they 
care little about is a minor inconvenience; doing so in a case where they have strong feelings 
is much more onerous. 
 
Strong feelings alone do not provide a sufficient reason to privilege conscience.  The strength 
of our feelings or belief is not a good indicator of whether they are reasonable.  Allowing 
someone to exercise their conscience does not provide a necessarily greater chance of getting 
the decisions they make correct.  Correctness, though, is not the fundamental reason to 
respect an individual’s decision of conscience.  Instead, respecting conscience is important 
because it is an essential element of respecting the autonomy of others.24  If we wish to allow 
others to exercise their own decision-making capabilities and to respect their worth as 
persons, then we must also respect the precursors to those autonomous decisions.25  One of 
those precursors is conscience.  It is the exercise of conscience which allows us to determine 
if our actions or inactions are morally acceptable or not and act accordingly.  Respecting 
other individuals’ conscience is a crucial part of respecting their autonomy.26 
 
This is important in medical law because we must take account of the autonomy of various 
parties.  Much of medical law seeks to ensure that patients are able to act according to their 
autonomous wishes,27 but we do a disservice to the idea of autonomy if we focus only on 
patients.28  Autonomy is an attribute that is shared by all persons.  It is this universality which 
is considered important to its use as an ethical foundation for medical law.29  We must 
remember that doctors as well as patients have autonomy.30  We can do as much harm if we 
require doctors to engage in practices they find abhorrent as we do when we force patients to 
accept treatment they do not want.  
 
III. Legal conceptions of conscience 
 
In legal decisions, individualised claims of conscience by doctors tend not to feature in the 
                                                 
24
 A Gold, ‘Physician’s “Right of Conscience” – Beyond Politics’ (2010) 38 Journal of Law, Medicine and 
Ethics 134, 139. 
25
 Sepper (n 17) 1526-1531.; RD Orr, ‘Autonomy, Conscience and Professional Obligation’ (2013) 3 American 
Medical Association Journal of Ethics 244.  
26
 MR Wicclair ‘Conscience-Based Exemptions for Medical Students’ (2010) 19 Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics 38, 39. 
27
  See, e.g., any of the cases on consent such as Re C (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819; 
Re B (adult: refusal of treatment) sub nom Ms B v. An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] 2 All ER 449. See also J 
Montgomery, ‘Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine’ (2006) 26 Legal Studies 185, 187. 
28
 M Brazier, ‘Do No Harm – Do Patients have Responsibilities too?’ (2006) 65 Cambridge L.J. 397; J. Coggon, 
‘Would Responsible Medical Lawyers Lose Their Patients?’ (2012) 20 Medical Law Review 130. 
29
 T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th Ed.) (New York: OUP 2013), 101-149. 
30
  Orr (n 25). 
equation.  They are rarely, if ever, discussed in general terms, nor is it made explicit when 
they are a ground for a legal decision.  Statutes, normally, only discuss conscience when it is 
based on predictable rule-based behaviour.  Cases, with the possible exception of Burke,31 do 
not mention claims of conscience as a reason to allow particular practices.  If claims of 
conscience provide a reason, it is usually not explicit.  Instead, in cases in which claims of 
conscience are in issue, we focus almost exclusively on the patient.  If the patient has 
capacity, then the focus is on their autonomous decision.  The clearest example of this is in 
the case of Ms. B.32 Ms. B was tetrapalegic and attached to a ventilator to help her breathing.  
Considering this intolerable, she asked for the ventilator to be withdrawn.33  Her doctors and 
health care team refused, primarily on the basis that they liked her and did not want to see her 
die.34  The hospital argued that they should not be made to remove the ventilator from Ms B 
because she was not making a truly informed choice since she had not attempted the 
suggested weaning process.35  They, therefore, presented a technical argument, but the 
doctors’ concern was apparently that they could not in good conscience withdraw the 
ventilator from her.36  Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P, in deciding the case, focused on 
whether Ms B has the capacity to make a decision.  Since all of the evidence presented to the 
court was that she had capacity, Dame Butler-Sloss determined that Ms. B’s autonomous 
decision controlled the case, and that if she wanted the ventilator withdrawn the hospital 
would have to find some way to oblige that wish.37  That included transferring her to another 
                                                 
31
 R (on the application of Burke) v. General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003, [2005] 3 FCR 169. 
32
 Ms B (n 27). 
33
 Ibid [47]. 
34
 Ibid [56]-[58]. 
35
 Ibid [63]. 
36
 Dame Butler-Sloss P refers to the doctor’s feelings about Ms B: ‘The clinicians had clearly become 
emotionally involved.  That situation was entirely understandable.  They had with the nursing staff kept Ms B 
alive and looked after her in every respect including her most intimate requirements.  Obviously, a relationship 
had built up’, ibid [98]. 
37
 Ibid [95]. 
institution willing to withdraw the ventilator if the hospital would not do so.38  The medical 
team’s feelings about the rightness or wrongfulness of doing this were not discussed in any 
depth, even though Dame Butler-Sloss agreed with the medical team that Ms B should not 
die.39 
 
If the patient is not determined to have capacity, then decisions will be made in her ‘best 
interests’ under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA).40  The MCA specifies that best 
interests entail a holistic judgement about the patient’s beliefs and wishes as well as their 
welfare.41  Furthermore, the views of carers, including doctors, family and friends should be 
taken into account, although only to the extent of helping to determine what the patient is 
likely to believe is in their best interests.42  There is, however, no indication that the doctor’s 
personal, as opposed to professional, views ought to be taken into account.  This implies that 
doctors should not consider their own conscience in determining what constitutes best 
interests in the specific case, even in situations where this might be appropriate.  Instead, the 
best interests test focuses on the patient and what might be relevant to her. 
 
Even if best interests do include claims of conscience by medical professionals, their 
inclusion distorts the actual issue.  Since the best interests are those of the patient, any claims 
of conscience by doctors must be in that context.  In other words, claims of conscience within 
the realm of best interests analysis do not focus on conscience as an attitude or belief of 
                                                 
38
 Ibid [100 (viii)].  Another hospital had already been found.  A doctor unrelated to the Trust in the case had 
offered to give Ms B a bed at their hospital and abide by her wishes regarding treatment.  Ibid [85]. 
39
 Dame Butler-Sloss P had considerable respect for Ms B, ‘I would like to add how impressed I am with her as 
a person ... I hope she will forgive me for saying, diffidently, that if she did reconsider her decision, she would 
have a lot to offer the community at large’, ibid [ 95].  She also makes it clear that while she is deciding that Ms 
B is capable of making the decision to have the ventilator withdrawn, Ms B can reconsider that decision. Ibid. 
[95]. 
40
 MCA, s 1(5). 
41
 MCA, s 4(6).  Also James (n 7) [39]. 
42
 MCA, s 4(7). 
doctors about their own conduct, but on a way to assess whether a particular treatment is best 
for the patient.  James provides an example of this in practice.  The objection of the doctors 
was not that the treatment, including RRT, would not work, but that to administer it was 
something they could not reasonably be asked to do to a patient.43  In the Court of Appeal this 
objection was used by the court to conclude that the treatment would not be in David’s best 
interests, despite admitting that he was happy and would probably want to continue to live.44  
The Court used the objection of the medical team to the proposed treatment to determine 
what constituted best interests.  However, this approach was not supported by Lady Hale in 
the Supreme Court.  She instead stated that in identifying best interests it was necessary to 
focus on the individual patient.45  Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court thus 
focused their attention on David’s best interests instead of conscience. 
 
Even so, there is evidence that claims of conscience played at least some part in the doctors’ 
views about the case.  First, there is considerable focus on the painful, discomforting, and 
distressing nature of the treatment, particularly in relation to RRT.  It also plays a role in the 
doctors’ views about the other treatments that David might receive.  In the case of RRT, Dr G 
referred to the shivering effect of the blood-thinning medication as the thing he is ‘personally 
really concerned about’.46  This concern is separated from the clinical concerns about RRT 
which Dr G expressed as the possibility of bleeding or strokes. These are hardly minor 
concerns; nevertheless, shivering was Dr G’s primary concern specifically the ‘distress’ and 
‘very unpleasant experience’ it would cause.47  This focus on the distressing rather than 
medical effects of the treatment suggests that Dr G’s primary concern was more moral than 
                                                 
43
 James (n 9) [22], [24], [25] per Ward LJ. 
44
 Ibid [46]-[47] per Ward LJ.  
45
 James (n 7) [39] per Lady Hale. 
46
 James (n 9) [24] per Ward LJ. 
47
 Ibid per Ward LJ. 
clinical. 
 
Moreover, the doctors repeatedly stated that they held this opinion despite the evidence of 
potential benefits to David, benefits they did not dispute.48  Additionally, neither the doctors 
nor the Court of Appeal argued that David would not have wanted treatment to continue had 
he been able to decide for himself.49  They also did not dispute the fact that he seemed to get 
significant benefit from the presence of his family and friends or the other interests that he 
had.  Similarly, they did not dispute that David’s family wished him to continue to receive 
treatment, at least partially on the basis that they believed it corresponded with his most likely 
wishes.  There are, consequently, significant benefits to David James if he received treatment 
like RRT.  Despite this, the doctors made it clear that they objected to the provision of these 
treatments.  When answering a hypothetical question, Dr G indicated that even if David had 
specifically communicated a request for these treatments, he would ‘explain[ ] why I thought 
that it would be deeply inappropriate for me as the attending clinician and the rest of my 
colleagues to offer these treatments’.50  While this claim is couched later in terms of ‘the right 
course of medical action’, the use of the phrase ‘deeply inappropriate’ indicates a moral 
rather than a clinical objection to providing treatment.  If the claim is more moral than 
clinical, it is likely to include at least an aspect of conscience. 
 
Neither of these two facts, individually or together, provides enough evidence to argue that 
claims of conscience were clearly at play in the James decision.  Instead, they highlight that 
                                                 
48
 This is not specifically stated in the sections replicated in the Court of Appeal judgment.  However, the 
doctors talked about the treatment options as being ‘distressing’, ‘discomforting’ or ‘painful’, ibid [22], [24], 
[25] per Ward LJ.  They do not indicate that RRT would not help David’s renal functioning.  This can be 
contrasted with the provision of antibiotics which the doctors clearly indicated would not be useful. Ibid [8] per 
Ward LJ. 
49
 Ibid [46]-[47] per Ward LJ. 
50
 Ibid [19] per Ward LJ, emphasis added. 
there are claims which sound like claims of conscience and can be interpreted in that manner.  
The focus on the pain, distress, and discomfort that the doctors would be causing David 
should they use these treatments, along with the claim that it would be inappropriate to offer 
them irrespective of David’s views, seem to shift the case towards a focus on what the 
doctors were prepared to offer as opposed to what he might have wanted to receive.  Dr G’s 
comments confirm this.  The question, as a consequence, has shifted from a patient-focused 
model (such as best interests) to one which is doctor-focused, and one which would have 
involved, at least partially, claims of conscience.  Consequently, there is a plausible case that 
claims of conscience were part of the doctor’s opinions in James.  Those claims, however, are 
never explicitly addressed by the courts. 
 
None of this means that judges do not consider the doctor’s conscience in cases which come 
before the court, it just means that these claims of conscience are often hidden by other legal 
concepts or rules.  If a judge uses conscience to decide a particular case, they may talk 
instead of different legal rules such as best interests to justify the decision, as they did in 
James.51  This is problematic because these claims of conscience are then not subject to any 
analysis by the judges.  Neither Ward LJ nor Arden LJ, for example, provided any 
meaningful analysis of the claims of conscience by the doctors in James.  There was no 
attempt to examine whether these claims of conscience were true; that is, that the doctor 
actually had the particular claims of conscience in question, nor to consider the effect of such 
a claim.  This does not necessarily provide protection for either patients or doctors, because 
these claims of conscience are not subject to any scrutiny, and even if a doctor has a 
legitimate claim of conscience, there is no guarantee that it will be considered in any 
meaningful way by the courts. As a consequence, a legitimate claim of conscience may not 
                                                 
51
 Ibid [45] per Ward LJ.  
be approved even in cases where it might be appropriate to do so. 
 
Moreover, hiding these sorts of claims within something like a best interests analysis distorts 
the use of that test.  Best interests, as Lady Hale makes clear in James, is a patient-centred 
approach.52  But the purpose of the test gets changed to include claims about what the doctor 
believes it is appropriate to provide, instead of focusing primarily on the patient.  This creates 
problems because what is best for the patient need not necessarily include things that the 
doctor feels able to provide.  James provides an example of this since the best interests of 
David would have meant that the treatment was continued.    The problem with providing the 
suggested treatments did not come from his perspective.  There is no reason to believe that, 
had it been possible to ask him, David would not have wanted the treatments in question. 
Indeed, the doctors appeared to accept this.53  However, forcing the best interests test to 
account for the doctors’ views changes the test to include aspects which are not only hidden, 
but need not be consistent with the factors which are the supposed reason for examining the 
best interests of the patient in the first place. 
 
IV. A conceptual model of decision-making in ethically troubling cases 
 
If claims of conscience are a necessary part of any decision in an ethically controversial case, 
then it behoves our legal mechanisms to find a way for the law to make them a factor.  This 
will provide a more accurate assessment of what has happened in a particular case and allow 
us to include the claims of conscience of the doctor in our legal understanding of the case at 
hand.  In developing a conceptual model of claims of conscience, there are several places we 
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 James (n 7) [39] per Lady Hale. 
53 James (n 9)[46]-[47] per Ward LJ. 
might begin.  The first is the guidance provided by the General Medical Council (GMC) and 
British Medical Association (BMA).  The GMC’s guidance is contained in paragraph 52 of 
Good Medical Practice,54 but it does not provide a detailed model for determining when and 
how doctors are entitled to object on the basis of conscience.55  Instead, it indicates merely 
that if a doctor has a conscientious objection they must express that objection to the patient 
and direct them to a ‘suitably qualified colleague’ or other doctor depending on the 
circumstances.  It thus only talks in general terms and provides little advice about how to 
handle a particular situation.  Additional advice is provided in Personal Belief and Medical 
Practice,56 but while it provides more information than the Good Medical Practice guidance, 
it is designed to deal with more generalizable, predictable, rule-based conscientious 
objections.  It talks in terms of ‘particular services or procedures’ but also specifies that 
doctors must notify patients in advance of their conscientious objection to providing such.57  
This may be possible in terms of generalizable, rule-based objections, such as not wishing to 
provide abortion services, but it is less possible in cases where the objection is based upon 
individual circumstances as it was in James.  Moreover, the same paragraph indicates that 
one way to notify patients is to ensure that any conscientious objections are disclosed within 
‘any printed material about [the] practice and the services’ provided.58  Again, this is possible 
where a doctor is clear about their conscientious objection to a practice or service beforehand, 
but it would not provide any significant advice to a doctor who has provided treatment in a 
specific case previously but now believes that things have reached ‘a bridge too far.’ 
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The BMA’s guidance also provides little that would aid the resolution of claims of 
conscience.  Its official policy indicates that doctors should have a right to conscientious 
objection in cases of abortion, fertility treatment, and the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment from a patient who lacks capacity.59  Like the GMC, then, the BMA focuses on 
generalizable and rule-based objections which can be predicted.  One of the reasons for its 
preference for largely statutory-based objections is that the BMA believes that the claims 
relate to ‘specific acts, not to specific individuals or groups of individuals’.60  Nevertheless, it 
indicates that other requests for conscientious objection could be considered provided that 
individual patients are not disadvantaged, but suggests no more than that these requests 
‘should be considered on their merits’.61  At best, then, the GMC’s and BMA’s guidance 
would allow a claims of conscience in a situation like James to be considered, but provides 
no mechanism or advice regarding how to do so. 
 
Academic literature also tends to focus on generalizable, predictable rule-based conscientious 
objections.  For example, Savulescu has argued that doctors should not be entitled to make a 
conscientious objection at all since their professional duties ought to override their personal 
ones.62  He does not see this as onerous as those with particularly strong objections could 
merely seek out a different specialism or, indeed, profession.  However, it is unclear how 
such a rule would work in the types of ‘this far, but no further’ cases we have been 
considering.  It would only appear to work in the case of an objection which was stable and 
based upon rule-based criteria such that an individual doctor could decide far enough in 
advance about such an objection to do something about it. 
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 More nuanced models of conscientious objections also seem to presume a focus on rule-
based ones. For example, Meyers and Woods have proposed a system for dealing with 
conscientious objection claims in abortion cases.63  They provide a list of six criteria which 
they (at least tentatively) believe provide a sufficient basis to judge objections on.64  These 
objections require that the ‘scruple-based objection’ be sincere, consistent with other beliefs 
and actions, fit within an otherwise coherent set of beliefs, and be a key component of the 
‘petitioner’s moral or religious framework’.65  Additionally, reasonable alternatives must be 
explored such as finding another doctor to provide treatment and the substitution of services.  
These criteria are to be determined by a review board at an ‘informal’ level, with possible 
appeals to a formal hearing of the board and then a court of competent jurisdiction.  In cases 
where the doctor in question has a generalizable, rule-based objection to a practice, such as 
abortion, Meyers and Woods model makes some sense.  A doctor could determine well in 
advance that they have an objection to a particular practice, articulate that decision in the 
subsequent manner, and have it adjudicated both informally and formally well before any 
adverse effect upon patients actually happened.  In a James-type situation, this may be less 
likely. In addition, it is unclear how the criteria Meyers and Woods develop would operate in 
such a case.  Requiring, for example, that the case be consistent with other beliefs and actions 
might be difficult in a situation where the doctor involved has provided the treatment in 
question to the patient before but now believes that, in the current situation, things have 
reached ‘a bridge too far.’  Moreover, the need to articulate a full-formed belief system might 
be likewise problematic in cases in which the issue involves a specific patient in specific 
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circumstances. 
 
None of this is surprising considering the fact that academics such as Meyers and Woods are 
primarily concerned with cases such as abortion ones.  In other words, the reason that their 
system would pose particular problems in a James-type claim of conscience case is that they 
were not considering this type of claim when they created their model.  Nor does it appear to 
have been one in the minds of those articulating the official positions of the BMA and GMC 
as they were presumably focusing on the statutory conscience clauses.  It is thus worth 
considering what a model might look like which focuses primarily on James-type  cases.  For 
the purposes of this model, we will consider a judicial decision-maker although there is no 
specific reason why one ought to be required.  This is merely because such cases are likely to 
end up in the courts for resolution if they cannot be decided by less formal means.  It, 
therefore, seems preferable to consider a model which could be used by judges in the 
determination of these sorts of cases. 
 
Since these sorts of cases are individualised and based upon a specific set of facts, it is first 
necessary to outline those facts for analysis.  This is likely to involve a relatively detailed 
history, diagnosis and prognosis of the patient.  The judge, like the doctor making the claim, 
will need to have a solid understanding of what has led to the current situation as well as how 
that situation might be different from previous points in time in the treatment of the patient.  
In addition to the clinical understanding of the condition, it will be necessary for the purposes 
of evaluation to have an understanding of what the patient wants.  This will depend on 
whether the patient has capacity.  If she does, then further questions arise as to whether they 
have been provided with sufficient information to be able to make an informed choice, and 
whether they have made that choice independently of controlling influences.  If the patient 
has capacity, has received sufficient information and made the choice free from controlling 
influences, then the decision made by the patient is autonomous,66 and thus worthy of respect, 
even if that decision is neither rational or wise. 
 
If the patient lacks the capacity to make an autonomous decision, then the analysis turns to 
her best interests.  But the lack of an autonomous decision does not mean that the analysis 
automatically moves to best interests.  If, for example, a patient has not made an autonomous 
decision because of a lack of information, then the issue is how best to inform the patient so 
that they could make one.67  The best interests test is only appropriate if the patient is 
incapable of making an autonomous decision, an issue which would be based on their 
capacity under the MCA.  As Lady Hale indicated in James, the best interests test is not an 
objective one,68 and, therefore, not based on some hypothetical idea about a reasonable 
patient.  Instead, the patient’s own interests, wishes and desires are the touchstone.69  It is a 
question as to what is best for this particular patient in this particular case.  Moreover, best 
interests are not limited simply to medical best interests;70 the test is what holistically is best 
for the patient.  This does not mean that the medical interests of the patient are not important, 
as the welfare of the patient is a crucial aspect of the decision about best interests.  That 
decision, however, is one made by the judge, and welfare interests are only part of the larger 
whole.  All of this information about the surrounding factual circumstances and the patient’s 
known or supposed wishes forms the background for the evaluation of the claim of 
conscience.  If a claim of conscience, as articulated earlier, is about what a doctor is willing 
to provide, it is a preliminary requirement to understand what the patient might be asking to 
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receive.  Only once this is done should the analysis turn to what it is that the doctor might feel 
willing to provide. 
 
The claim of conscience itself should be subject to evaluation.  This will require, first, that 
the doctor is able to articulate the claim as a conscience-based one, as opposed to some other 
type of claim.71  Is this something which is against the conscience of the doctor to provide?  It 
is also necessary for it to be an actual claim rather than a plausible claim.  The claim of 
conscience must be based on what the doctor actually believes, not what she might have 
believed.  Furthermore, the doctor must be able to articulate reasons as to why they have this 
particular belief.  This does not require a substantial, thought-out coherent set of beliefs based 
upon a comprehensive ethical or religious view.  Instead, the doctor must be able to articulate 
why it is that the treatment in this case is subject to a claim of conscience.  What is it about 
this case and these circumstances that means the doctor is unable to provide the requested 
treatment?  What differentiates this case from other cases where the doctor has provided the 
treatment, or would do so?  The doctor is not required to articulate a firm set of beliefs in the 
way Meyers and Woods suggest, but they must be able to provide some reason which 
explains why this case is different from other cases.  These cannot be any reasons but must be 
limited to the treatment in question and its effect upon the patient.  And it is not acceptable 
for a doctor to object to provide treatment for a patient for a reason which would otherwise 
count as discriminatory.  For example, a doctor could not object to providing treatment to a 
patient merely because it would leave a patient physically disabled. 
 
The final aspect of the analysis which must be examined are the costs of accepting claims of 
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conscience.  If the claim of conscience was accepted, what is the likely result?  This includes 
not only looking at the physical result that will most likely occur for the patient, but also 
whether there are any alternatives available.  For example, is it possible to transfer the patient 
to another doctor, medical team, or hospital which is willing to provide the treatment that the 
patient seeks?  Is it possible to provide alternative treatments which might be effective in the 
situation which fit the claim of conscience of the doctor?  If providing alternative treatment 
options is not possible, are their options which are at least available which will provide, for 
example, palliation to the patient?  These concerns are important because even a reasonable 
claim of conscience might be overridden in a case where the effects on the patient are too 
severe under the circumstances. 
 
V. A Test Case 
 
We can test this model using James as an example, and then explain where the real fault lines 
in the case lie, and what role conscience played in the case.  Under the model, we start with 
information about the patient’s condition, history, and prognosis.  From the evidence 
available in the decisions, David was in significant decline which seemed to require ever 
increasing levels of treatment.  We know that he was a permanent fixture in the Intensive 
Care Unit of the hospital, and there was little to no chance that he would leave it.  The 
treatments included RRT, CPR, and ‘invasive support for circulatory problems’.72  These are 
significant treatments with associated problems, including, at least as far as RRT was 
concerned, the likelihood of 24-hour care which would make David shiveringly cold. 
 
With regards to what, if anything, David wanted to receive in terms of treatment, it does not 
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appear that the doctors discussed with him what he might want in a situation he now found 
himself in before he was determined to lack the capacity to decide for himself.  So, it was not 
possible to rely on his autonomous decisions in determining how to treat him.  Instead, the 
court had to determine what his best interests were, and it is here that the dispute between the 
courts emerged.  The Court of Appeal argued that the best interests test was objective and 
that David’s medical best interests, as determined objectively, controlled the determination of 
his best interests overall.73  The Supreme Court disagreed.  Lady Hale decided that best 
interests were an individual decision.  It did not matter what a reasonable patient would have 
wanted.  What mattered was what was best for David, which included what he would have 
wanted under the circumstances.74  Taking that as the appropriate test, the provision of these 
treatments would have been in David’s best interests at the time of the original trial court 
decision since, as noted aboveall of the indications show that he was happy despite his 
medical condition.75  According to Lady Hale, it did not matter whether the proposed 
treatment could return him to a life of significant function, or whether he would ever be able 
to return home.76  What mattered was what he would have considered best under the 
circumstances, and the trial judge was justified in saying that meant that treatment ought to 
continue.77 
 
The remaining issues surround the doctor’s claims of conscience.  As noted in Section III 
above, there was evidence to believe that the doctors’ objections to continuing to treat David 
relied, at least in part, on matters of conscience.  They were concerned about the distress, 
pain, and discomfort that he would experience if the treatment had to be provided.  More 
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importantly, their objections were framed in terms of what they thought they ought to provide 
to him, rather than what he would have wanted to receive.  The doctors expressed the view 
that, even if David had capacity and requested the treatment at issue, they still would have 
refused to provide it.  Moreover, since they did not dispute the family’s claim that David 
would have wanted to continue treatment and that it provided important benefits to him, the 
doctors’ concern involved a belief about what they could be asked to provide and not what 
was necessarily ‘best’ for David.  We can, therefore, presume, under the model, that the 
doctors did have claims of conscience in the case. 
 
It then becomes necessary to determine whether the doctors could have provided a set of 
reasons to explain why this particular claim of conscience ought to be accepted.  Considering 
the importance of non-maleficence as a bioethical principle,78 in addition to the fact that RRT 
does not normally continue as long as they thought it might have to in this case,79 there is 
evidence that the position of the doctors was based upon acceptable reasons.  Treating a 
patient who is shiveringly cold because of something you have done must be troubling, 
especially if there is nothing the doctors can do to alleviate the situation.  They would have 
been required to treat David continuously despite the difficulties they were causing him, 
which means the treatment would be significantly harder for the doctors to accept providing.  
Providing a bad side effect for a limited time for treatment which will ultimately provide a 
benefit is one thing, doing so for a considerably longer period of time without an ultimate 
goal is another.  This would be ethically problematic, and there is, therefore, no reason to 
believe that the doctors’ claims of conscience in the case were anything other than based 
upon these reasons.  There is no evidence in the case, for example, that there was any 
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discriminatory basis for their reasons for not providing the treatment. 
 
The effects of this claim of conscience, however, are substantial for David.  The reason these 
treatments were at issue is because they were the only ones thought to have a prospect of 
improving his condition.  Otherwise, the doctors appear to have been limited to more 
palliative options.  This is why the family objected so strongly to not providing the treatment, 
because they believed this course of action would lead to his death.  There might, however, 
have been alternatives, although the case does not make this clear.  For example, it might 
have been possible to transfer David to another treatment team, either within the same 
hospital or to a different one.  This would have meant that he would have still been able to 
receive the treatment everyone thought he wanted, while allowing his doctors to make their 
claims of conscience.  This might have been a particularly useful resolution in the light of the 
fact that David did not, at the time of the initial case, require any of the specified treatments.80  
It was not a case where the doctors were being required to do anything at the time nor, more 
to the point, anything which might have been against their claims of conscience.  Transferring 
David to another team (within or without the hospital) was not explored by the court, and it 
is, therefore, unclear whether it was available.  It is possible that all medical teams and 
hospitals, or at least all medical teams and hospitals to which he could feasibly have been 
moved, shared the opinions of the doctors in this case.  If that were so, the effects of claims of 
conscience become weightier and, despite their objections, it might have been necessary to 
force them to continue unless, of course, this fell outside the normal bounds of proper 
medical treatment.  Furthermore, the options the doctors would have accepted are not clear 
nor is there any indication how effective they might have been.  We do not know, for 
example, how much David could have been benefited from palliative methods, or whether 
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those methods would have allowed him to enjoy some of the benefits of continued existence.  
Thus, if the only way to successfully deal with David’s pain was to put him in a state which 
meant that he did not recognise his family, this might present problems for the doctors’ 
claims of conscience since family seems to have been so important to him.  
 
Without full information about the effects of claims of conscience, it is not possible to reach a 
firm result in our test case.  Nevertheless, it provides us with important questions to be 
considered.  For example, if evidence at court had shown that an alternative treatment team 
could have been arranged for David, then the claims of conscience ought to have been 
accepted.  If it could not, then the issue becomes more difficult, and requires further questions 
about the options acceptable to the doctors and the anticipated effects of those treatments. 
 
VI. Benefits of the new model 
 
From this example we can see that my model accurately reflects the issues involved in 
ethically troubling cases, and identifies the relevant questions.  These are important aspects of 
a conceptual model for ethically difficult cases which includes claims of conscience, but they 
are not the only benefits which might accrue from using such a model.  The model is 
beneficial to the doctor because it recognises the importance of the doctor’s autonomy in 
medical law.  As noted above, if we truly wish to respect autonomy we need to respect the 
autonomy of all of the parties involved in medical cases.81  This includes, at a minimum, the 
autonomy of the doctor as well as that of the patient.  My model accomplishes this by 
providing a justification for doctors to make honest claims of conscience.  Doctors can make 
these claims directly as opposed to having to hide them behind other principles.  There is no 
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need for a doctor to force a claim of conscience into a connection with the patient’s best 
interests, as they appear to have done in James.  This ability to make direct claims of 
conscience will allow doctors to assert an autonomy interest in the actions that they perform.  
It will help to separate these autonomy claims from the best interests and welfare concerns 
that doctors might have about the patient, as I have shown in Section V above. 
 
In addition, this model of decision-making exposes the conscience of doctors to more regular 
scrutiny.  Since the claim of conscience is not hidden behind other principles, judges can 
more effectively examine whether those claims are reasonable because they can be addressed 
directly.  Judges will then be less likely to be misled that a claim of conscience is something 
else, and can analyse these claims more appropriately.  A claim of conscience is different to a 
claim about the patient’s best interests and should be evaluated on different grounds.  
Allowing a general space for these claims to be made provides a mechanism which allows for 
that evaluation.  Additionally, if claims of conscience become a more regular part of these 
sorts of cases, judges will be better able to determine when one exists, even if it is hidden 
behind other values.  The more experience the court has with evaluating claims of 
conscience, the more likely the court is to recognise these claims and act accordingly. 
 
We can see this through an examination of what could have happened in Ms. B if claims of 
conscience had been a regular aspect of the analysis.  As stated in Section III above, the 
doctors did not want to remove the ventilator from Ms B because they did not think that it 
was the right thing to do.  However, without further analysis, that particular claim is unclear.  
We do not have an understanding about why the doctors thought the removal of artificial 
ventilation was unacceptable.  We can speculate about two possible answers.  First, the 
doctors were worried about causing the death of Ms B.  Alternatively, they were concerned 
primarily with a potential violation of the law.  The first possibility is one that the court is 
likely to consider reasonable, the second is not because the court has informed doctors that 
these actions do not violate the law.82  More importantly, being able to subject these claims of 
conscience to scrutiny provides the court with an effective way to regulate the doctor’s 
behaviour.  If the claim was the first one, then a judge’s best response is probably to do what 
Dame Butler-Sloss did in the actual case, move the patient to a doctor willing to perform the 
specified action.  If it is the second, then a more effective answer would have been to re-
emphasise to the doctors that removing the ventilator was not a crime.  But it is only when 
these claims of conscience receive proper scrutiny that these answers become clear. 
 
A new model of medical decision-making, which allows space to consider a doctor’s claim of 
conscience, would also result in returning the concept of best interests to a focus on the 
patient and her interests.  At the moment, best interests includes a hidden element of the 
doctor’s conscience, as an action is considered to be in the best interests of the patient only if 
the doctor is willing to do it.  This is especially true in the cases that we have been 
considering.  However, this conflates questions of what the doctor is willing to do, what the 
patient wants, and what may be best for them.  Distinguishing between these provides the 
opportunity to focus on them individually in order to better understand what really matters for 
patients and doctors so these sometimes competing claims can be properly balanced. 
 
The James decision again provides a good example of this benefit.  As noted in Section IV, 
the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court talk in terms of David’s best 
interests but there is evidence that the case was primarily about the doctors’ claims of 
conscience.  This is what causes problems, particularly in the Court of Appeal.  The Court 
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cannot justify forcing the doctors to act in a way they find abhorrent but can only avoid it by 
making statements about what is best for David which miscast his interests, beliefs and 
welfare.  Limiting the court’s ability to use claims of conscience in appropriate cases means 
that concepts such as best interests have to be forced to fit situations where they are not 
appropriate. 
 
Another benefit of this new model is that is allows for conscience-based claims which are not 
based upon predictive, generalizable rules.  While this has been the dominant model for 
conscientious objections, not all conscience-based claims take this form.  Many are 
objections to specific instances of a practice which the doctor might generally agree with.  
The reasons why a particular case might be objectionable could also rely on a number of 
individual factors which make it difficult to predict them in advance or provide a coherent set 
of rules which would apply in all situations.  A decision-making model such as this, which 
provides a way to analyse individual claims of conscience, offers a way to explore these types 
of claims without requiring an individual to fit into a classification which might not be 
accurate.  A final benefit is that it provides a way to fully explore issues that arise between 
individual doctors and the profession.  Doctors do not need to necessarily agree with the view 
of the profession as a whole.  Actions which they think inappropriate may be accepted by the 
profession and vice-versa.  Conscience provides a way to evaluate these differences and the 
model provides a mechanism to do that.  Since claims of conscience are evaluated by an 
objective third party, the court, it becomes possible to explore situations where an individual 
doctor differs from the rest of the profession. 
 
VII. Problems with the new decision-making model 
 
While there are benefits to this new model, there are, of course, problems too.  The first 
problem concerns the power of doctors.  Allowing a doctor to refuse to provide a particular 
treatment because it is against her conscience could be another way for doctors to reassert 
power over patients.  The disparity in power between the two is already considerable, and we 
need to guard against exacerbating this.  There are several possible responses.  We could 
claim that doctors are already using claims of conscience in practice, and, therefore, this new 
model changes very little.  That would not be accurate, however.  Doctors do use conscience 
in determining which treatments they will provide, but giving them a more open way to 
utilise claims of conscience is not likely to lead to fewer instances of its use.  Instead, the 
benefit of the model lies in exposing these claims to scrutiny.  Doctors will first have to show 
that they have a claim of conscience, instead of merely showing that a claim of conscience is 
possible, and then that claim is based on justifiable reasons and does not have an 
unacceptable adverse effect upon the patient.  The new model might thus better constrain a 
doctor’s power over her patient.  Since claims of conscience are subject to a more searching 
scrutiny, suspect claims are less likely to be allowed.  This should, therefore, provide less 
power to doctors. 
 
For this model to work it will be crucial that courts actually exercise their authority in this 
area.  This, however, leads to the unfortunate second problem, the use of Bolam83 in medical 
law cases.  While there might have been a historical claim that courts will defer to doctor’s 
judgment on cases which fall outside of their specific expertise, the most recent statement of 
the Supreme Court indicates less willingness to do so, at least outside specifically clinical 
matters.84 As a consequence, the problems of Bolam are less likely to be an issue, at least if 
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Montgomery is an indication. 
 
Even if the new model does not provide greater power to doctors, we may wish to avoid it on 
the ground that it lessens the power of patients.  As a result, patients might be considered to 
have less right to make autonomous decisions than they do now.  That concern, though, over-
estimates the power that patients currently have.  As case law makes clear, patients do not 
have a right to require that doctors provide particular treatment.85  All they have is a right to 
request that treatment.86  If the requested procedure would not fulfil the duty that the doctor 
has to the patient – if it is not considered proper medical treatment - then there is no 
requirement that a doctor provide it, even if the patient sincerely desires it.87  Thus, the new 
model would not take away from patients something that they currently have.  Moreover, 
there is the possibility it will provide an additional benefit to patients because it will allow 
them to contest these claims of conscience to determine whether they are reasonable.  At the 
moment doctors, by hiding claims of conscience behind other values, prevent patients from 
contesting and evaluating those claims.  Pushing them out into the open will allow them to be 
analysed and explored just like the other claims involved in medical cases benefitting patients 
and providing them with additional resources in medical decision-making. 
 
The final potential problem is not about the power of either doctors or patients but of the 
courts.  If we use this new model of decision-making to explore decisions in ethically 
difficult medical cases, the final authority for the decision will rest with the courts.  It will, 
therefore, ultimately be out of the hands of both doctors and patients.  It would instead lie 
with a third party, a judge, who may not understand the views of either party.  Judges may 
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come to these cases with their own biases and prejudices which might influence their 
decisions.  For example, a judge may have a particular view about treatment at the end of life 
which influences the way she views the claim of conscience by a doctor in a case involving 
that treatment.  If that view is no more advanced than that of the patient or the doctor, there is 
no reason why it should prevail, especially since the judge will not have to face the 
consequences of that decision.  Furthermore, there is the additional problem raised by 
Montgomery that the legalisation of medicine has resulted in the de-moralisation of 
medicine.88  Claims which were initially based on moral ideas become legalistic and 
substantive moral claims are consequently lost in the discussion.  He is also sceptical of the 
distinction between medical and moral decisions, and argues in favour of the creation of a 
‘legitimate common moral community’ which accepts that medical and moral decision-
making are interlinked and not separate.89 
 
While I share Montgomery’s concerns about the de-moralisation of medicine and am 
sympathetic to the creation of a ‘legitimate common moral community’, I am probably more 
cynical about the ability of doctors to effectively do so without significant oversight.  Unless 
and until medical education changes to put an increasing emphasis on medical ethics, the 
training doctors receive on that front can be largely haphazard.  Indeed, Montgomery notes 
that most medical ethics training happens ‘from their experience of practice’.90  The real life 
application of ethics is to be respected, but ethical training also requires reflection, 
discussion, and interaction with others about the moral principles which underlie a decision.  
Not all of these might be present in the sorts of practice experiences Montgomery notes.  As a 
consequence, there is a need for oversight of the ethical decisions that doctors make.  Judges 
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can provide that kind of oversight, not because they have any particular privileged position in 
relation to ethics but because they have experience in setting boundaries about decision-
making processes.  They can, therefore, play the role of gatekeeper and set limits on what 
constitutes the kinds of decisions which qualify as reasonable in these types of cases.  They 
can thus set a basic framework from which Montgomery’s common moral community can 
grow and develop. 
 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
In this article I have explored claims of conscience which are not predictable and 
generalizable rule-based conscientious objections, but are based on individualised, specific 
facts and have arisen in situations where doctors might previously have provided the 
requested treatment but now decide that things have reached a ‘bridge too far.’  These claims 
of conscience are different from what we consider standard conscientious objection claims, 
and have not been specifically addressed by the courts.  Instead, they are hidden behind legal 
tests such as best interests.  This causes problems because the best interests test does not 
provide an effective method for analysing these types of claims.  Instead, it distorts the use of 
that test.  However, these types of conscience claims should be subject to direct analysis 
instead of being subsumed under other legal and ethical tests.  The model proposed in Section 
IV not only allows for a direct analysis of claims of conscience by doctors in these sorts of 
cases but does so in a way which protects the interests of patients.  Courts would be better 
suited if they examined cases like James using such a model than the method currently 
employed because it provides a clear explanation of the actual problem in these sorts of cases.  
This is not only better from an analytical perspective but might also provide a way for doctors 
and patients to discuss more openly and honestly how conscience affects the difficult and 
often terrible choices that must be made at the end of life. 
